bne IntelliNews – Bosnian Serb leader threatens secession if Republika Srpska’s state property law is scrapped

bne IntelliNews – Bosnian Serb leader threatens secession if Republika Srpska’s state property law is scrapped

Milorad Dodik, the president of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska, claimed his entity will secede if a state home regulation, briefly banned by the condition-stage constitutional court, is not applied. 

Bosnia consists of two autonomous entities – the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska, each individual owning their individual parliament, governing administration and president. There are also state-degree institutions.

At the end of December, Republika Srpska’s parliament adopted the draft invoice on immovable residence made use of for the operating of public authorities, which was strongly objected to by the Bosniaks as it dominated that all immovable residence on the territory of Republika Srpska belongs to the entity.

This was in violation of an earlier ruling by the state-level constitutional court invalidating an previously regulation handed by Republika Srpska lawmakers, that set immovable house beneath the control of the entity’s authorities.

Before in March, the point out-amount constitutional court docket temporarily banned the law’s implementation, just after the intercontinental community’s higher consultant Christian Schmidt suspended the law’s software.

“If you steal our property, you have broken Bosnia & Herzegovina. We will not be in that BiH. This crew of individuals will not go over this issue in the Parliamentary Assembly or the Council of Ministers since the situation has been settled,” Dodik informed reporters in Banja Luka as quoted by N1.

Dodik mentioned the entity will implement the regulation in spite of Schmidt’s ban. He insists that point out property belongs to the two entities and that Republika Srpska will restore its jurisdiction over all residence, which includes that which was beforehand transferred to the state.

“[T]he difficulty has been fixed simply because, in accordance to the Dayton Arrangement, the property belongs to the entities,” Dodik claimed on March 9.

Dodik also explained that, next the constitutional court’s ruling, Republika Srpska will draft an additional law to consider above the point out home.

“We shall crack away Republika Srpska if you attempt to steal our home. If it is a concern of choose it or depart it, we shall take it, so they leave it,” Dodik said.

He also put below problem Bosnia’s EU path, expressing this was not the only route. Dodik has for yrs been openly professional-Russian and professional-Serbian, and argues that the entity ought to secede from Bosnia and turn into section of Serbia.

Dodik also explained that the fate of the EU is questionable, as “it will disintegrate immediately after the withdrawal of the US from Europe”.

Virginia judge uses slavery law to rule frozen embryos are property

Virginia judge uses slavery law to rule frozen embryos are property

Frozen human embryos can lawfully be thought of assets, or “chattel,” a Virginia choose has ruled, basing his conclusion in component on a 19th century regulation governing the treatment of slaves.

The preliminary viewpoint by Fairfax County Circuit Court docket Choose Richard Gardiner – delivered in a lengthy-operating dispute concerning a divorced spouse and spouse – is currently being criticized by some for wrongly and unnecessarily delving into a time in Virginia heritage when it was legally permissible to very own human beings.

“It’s repulsive and it is morally repugnant,” mentioned Susan Crockin, a law firm and scholar at Georgetown University’s Kennedy Institute of Ethics and an specialist in reproductive technological know-how law.

Solomon Ashby, president of the Previous Dominion Bar Association, a specialist organization made up primarily of African American lawyers, identified as Gardiner’s ruling troubling.

“I would like to imagine that the bench and the bar would be trying to get much more modern precedent,” he claimed.

Gardiner did not return a phone to his chambers Wednesday. His determination, issued last thirty day period, is not final: He has not however ruled on other arguments in the case involving Honeyhline and Jason Heidemann, a divorced few combating above two frozen embryos that keep on being in storage.

Honeyhline Heidemann, 45, needs to use the embryos. Jason Heidemann objects.

In the beginning, Gardiner sided with Jason Heidemann. The regulation at the heart of the situation governs how to divide “items and chattels.” The judge dominated that simply because embryos could not be purchased or sold, they could not be deemed as this kind of and as a result Honeyhline Heidemann experienced no recourse below that law to declare custody of them.

But soon after the ex-wife’s lawyer, Adam Kronfeld, asked the choose to reconsider, Gardiner carried out a deep dive into the history of the law. He found that before the Civil War, it also used to slaves. The decide then investigated aged rulings that ruled custody disputes involving slaves, and mentioned he observed parallels that compelled him to reconsider no matter if the law ought to utilize to embryos.

In a separate portion of his feeling, Gardiner also said he erred when he at first concluded that human embryos simply cannot be marketed.

“As there is no prohibition on the sale of human embryos, they may possibly be valued and marketed, and hence might be thought of ‘goods or chattels,’” he wrote.

Crockin said she’s not knowledgeable of any other judge in the U.S. who has concluded that human embryos can be bought and marketed. She claimed the pattern, if everything, has been to figure out that embryos have to be taken care of in a more nuanced way than as mere home.

Ashby stated he was baffled that Gardiner felt a need to have to delve into slavery to answer a issue about embryos, even if Virginia circumstance law is thin on how to cope with embryo custody queries.

“Hopefully, the jurisprudence will progress in the commonwealth of Virginia these that … we will no longer see slave codes” cited to justify authorized rulings, he explained.

Neither of the Heidemanns’ attorneys at any time elevated the slavery situation. They did raise other arguments in support of their instances, having said that.

Jason Heidemann’s lawyers explained letting his ex-wife to implant the embryos they established when they ended up married “would power Mr. Heidemann to procreate from his wishes and for that reason violate his constitutional proper to procreational autonomy.”

Honeyhline Heidemann’s attorney, Kronfeld, argued that Honeyhline’s ideal to the embryos outweighs her ex-husband’s objections, partly due to the fact he would have no lawful obligations to be their mum or dad and partly since she has no other selections to conceive biological small children just after going through most cancers treatments that created her infertile.

Kronfeld also argued that the original separation settlement the few signed in 2018 now taken care of the embryos as house when they concurred — less than a subheading titled “Division of Personal Assets” — that the embryos would stay in cryogenic storage until a courtroom ordered if not.

Gardiner has not still dominated on the argument over Jason Heidemann’s procreational autonomy.

In a Rare Decision On Abandoned Property Law, The US Supreme Court Rules Against Delaware

In a Rare Decision On Abandoned Property Law, The US Supreme Court Rules Against Delaware

On February 28, 2023, the US Supreme Court docket issued its final decision in the abandoned home lawsuit, Delaware v. Pennsylvania (see https://www.supremecourt.gov/thoughts/22pdf/145orig_kjfl.pdf)

The concern dealt with by the Courtroom centered on which state was entitled to accumulate unclaimed home, which arose from  two money products marketed by banking institutions on behalf of Moneygram: Agent Checks and Teller’s Checks (collectively, the “Checks”).

Next the framework founded in the seminal scenario of Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674 (1965), since Moneygram did not have the name and tackle of the homeowners of the Checks, Moneygram experienced been escheating (that is, having to pay in excess of to the state) the money fundamental these dormant Checks to its point out of incorporation, Delaware. 

That rule, paying unclaimed house to the point out of incorporation in occasions the place the identify and deal with of the individual residence owner is not regarded, broadly applies to most residence, apart from for dollars orders and tourists checks.   This exception occurs from a 1974 federal regulation, the Federal Disposition Act (“FDA”), 12 USC  § 2501 et seq), which involves holders of money underlying unused funds orders and vacationers checks (and other identical instruments) to remit these funds to the point out in which the instruments ended up procured, not the holder’s point out of incorporation.

For that reason, the Supreme Courtroom centered on  no matter whether the Checks should be subject to the Texas v. New Jersey framework or regardless of whether they had been similar adequate to income orders so that they, also, as soon as deserted, really should be paid out to the point out where ordered and not the point out of incorporation. 

The Supreme Courtroom held, in the first the vast majority impression penned by new Supreme Courtroom Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, that the Checks were being in fact similar to revenue orders, and should be escheated to the point out of acquire below the Food and drug administration, and not the condition of incorporation:

When a money solution operates like a dollars order— i.e., when it is a prepaid prepared instrument employed to transmit cash to a named payee—and when it would also escheat inequitably entirely to the Condition of incorporation of the business keeping the funds below our popular-law policies because of to recordkeeping gaps, then it is sufficiently “similar” to a dollars buy to slide presumptively inside the Food and drug administration.  (598 U.S. __ slip op. at 22)

This is viewed as a much more equitable rule, allowing for the assets to be dispersed among a number of states where the industrial exercise happened.

There was a large total of revenue at stake: some estimate Delaware will owe far more than $400 million to the other states based mostly on the outcome in this lawsuit.

The bigger concern is regardless of whether, now that the definition of “money orders” (and related instruments) below the Fda has been widened to include the Checks, will other financial solutions and devices also be topic to a identical resolve?  We foresee that lots of states will be using a closer appear at “prepaid created devices used to transmit money” in order to maximize their deserted assets collections.

Supreme Court on Abandoned Property Lawsuit

Supreme Court on Abandoned Property Lawsuit

On February 28, 2023, the US Supreme Court docket issued its choice in the abandoned property lawsuit, Delaware v. Pennsylvania (see https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/145orig_kjfl.pdf)

The issue tackled by the Court docket centered on which state was entitled to accumulate unclaimed assets, which arose from  two fiscal products offered by banking institutions on behalf of Moneygram: Agent Checks and Teller’s Checks (collectively, the “Checks”).

Subsequent the framework proven in the seminal circumstance of Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674 (1965), simply because Moneygram did not have the title and deal with of the owners of the Checks, Moneygram had been escheating (that is, paying out over to the state) the resources fundamental these dormant Checks to its condition of incorporation, Delaware. 

That rule, paying unclaimed residence to the state of incorporation in cases the place the title and handle of the particular person property proprietor is not recognized, broadly applies to most assets, besides for money orders and vacationers checks.   This exception arises from a 1974 federal law, the Federal Disposition Act (“FDA”), 12 USC  § 2501 et seq), which involves holders of money fundamental unused dollars orders and tourists checks (and other identical instruments) to remit those people money to the state in which the instruments ended up ordered, not the holder’s point out of incorporation.

Hence, the Supreme Court centered on  whether the Checks must be matter to the Texas v. New Jersey framework or regardless of whether they were being very similar ample to revenue orders so that they, also, at the time deserted, should really be paid out to the point out the place ordered and not the point out of incorporation. 

The Supreme Courtroom held, in the 1st greater part impression penned by new Supreme Courtroom Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, that the Checks have been in fact very similar to cash orders, and must be escheated to the state of purchase less than the Food and drug administration, and not the point out of incorporation:

When a financial product operates like a revenue order— i.e., when it is a pay as you go published instrument utilised to transmit cash to a named payee—and when it would also escheat inequitably solely to the State of incorporation of the business holding the funds under our widespread-legislation regulations because of to recordkeeping gaps, then it is sufficiently “similar” to a income purchase to slide presumptively inside the Food and drug administration.  (598 U.S. __ slip op. at 22)

This is thought of a extra equitable rule, enabling the residence to be distributed among many states in which the professional activity transpired.

There was a incredible amount of money at stake: some estimate Delaware will owe additional than $400 million to the other states based on the end result in this lawsuit.

The more substantial question is regardless of whether, now that the definition of “money orders” (and identical instruments) under the Fda has been widened to consist of the Checks, will other monetary products and devices also be topic to a equivalent determination?  We foresee that lots of states will be using a nearer glimpse at “prepaid published devices utilised to transmit money” in order to maximize their deserted home collections.  

The Place Where Property Law Happens in New York City

The Place Where Property Law Happens in New York City

Last thirty day period, the New York Periods documented on a pitched adverse possession fight involving two household buildings on the Upper East Side of Manhattan.

On a coveted stretch of Fifth Avenue, techniques away from Central Park, the shareholders of an Higher East Aspect cooperative are battling for an unconventional prize: the possession of a grimy concrete ditch at the rear of their luxurious condominium building.

The approximately 350-square-foot plot is at the center of a lawsuit submitted on Friday in New York State Supreme Court docket that pits the millionaire inhabitants of 980 Fifth Avenue versus the real estate mogul and former governor of New York, Eliot Spitzer, who owns an adjacent rental tower. . . .

In its lawsuit, the co-op board is arguing that it ought to be the rightful owner of the pit by way of a doctrine named adverse possession, in which a celebration can make a authorized claim to a home after 10 ongoing a long time of undisputed use. Even though the assets is lawfully owned by Mr. Spitzer’s neighboring rental constructing, 985 Fifth Avenue, the co-op claims that it has routinely and openly made use of the around six-foot-deep niche to shop design materials and has by no means been requested to quit.

For all those of us instructing Assets to 1Ls, the timing of the story could not have been greater, as adverse possession frequently will make an early visual appearance in the study course. It also served as clean evidence of how musty outdated authorized doctrines can be pretty suitable in contemporary property disputes (particularly where by, as listed here, the events show up to be inspired by far more than just residence.

I did not recognize it at the time, but the spot of the dispute—79th and Fifth Avenue along Central Park—was also the site of a renowned assets scenario that is a staple of the 1L survey course: Brokaw v. Fairchild.

In advance of this corner was occupied by residential towers, it was the site of the Brokaw mansion. This mansion, crafted in the late 19th century, was bequeathed to George Brokaw in life estate. George did not want to live there, on the other hand, and had a difficult time finding anyone inclined to spend what he thought was a acceptable lease, so he needed to tear down the mansion and develop an apartment making. The only dilemma is that these who held future pursuits in the property (the “remaindermen,” i.e. individuals who held contingent remainders) objected to these options, major to a lawsuit.

In the end, the courts turned down George’s options, holding that it would represent “waste” for him to essentially improve the mother nature of the house by tearing down the mansion and setting up an apartment creating.  Wrote the courtroom, “this sort of demolition would consequence in these kinds of an damage to the inheritance as underneath the authorities would represent squander,” even if (as George claimed) it would boost the price of the assets.

The Brokaw mansion survived, and George lived there until his death in 1935. The mansion was eventually owned by Time magazine publisher Henry Luce, who was married to Clare Booth Luce (who had earlier been married to George). Inevitably, in 1964, the mansion was torn down and replaced with a residential tower—a household tower that, as luck would have it, is now at the centre of the aforementioned adverse possession fight, presenting nevertheless a different opportunity for the corner of 79th and Fifth to obtain a spot in House Regulation casebooks.

States prevail over Delaware in unclaimed property case at the Supreme Court

States prevail over Delaware in unclaimed property case at the Supreme Court

All nine Supreme Court Justices sided with a group of 30 states in a dispute with Delaware over hundreds of millions of dollars of unclaimed checks issued by MoneyGram, a money transfer company. The Court held that the unclaimed checks must be sent to the states where they were purchased, and not to Delaware, the company’s state of incorporation. The case turned on the interpretation of the Federal Disposition Act,1 a federal statute enacted by Congress in 1974, which governs escheatment of money orders “or other similar written instruments.”2 The Court held that the MoneyGram checks were similar to money orders, and therefore the federal statute determines which state can escheat the unclaimed funds.

The case has the potential to put a significant dent in Delaware’s unclaimed property revenue. In 2022, after accounting for amounts returned to property owners, the State’s unclaimed property revenue was $349 million, or approximately 6{c024931d10daf6b71b41321fa9ba9cd89123fb34a4039ac9f079a256e3c1e6e8} of total state revenue.3 Although this number is down from recent years, some reports indicate that Delaware could owe as much as $400 million back to other states solely from this case.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson delivered the opinion on February 28, 2023 for a Court that ruled unanimously against Delaware. The MoneyGram case represents the first time the Supreme Court has grappled with escheatment and unclaimed property issues since the early 1990s, when the Court decided Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993).

Before this case, the State of Delaware had been taking custody of these MoneyGram checks based on the common law priority rule that allows a company’s state of incorporation to take custody of abandoned property when the address of the owner is unknown. Other states, led by Pennsylvania and Arkansas, filed suit against Delaware and argued that, for these MoneyGram checks, the Federal Disposition Act overrides the common law rule. The Federal Disposition Act provides that unclaimed funds from money orders or “other similar written instruments” are to be escheated to the state where the checks were purchased. The parties disagreed on which rule should apply: the federal statute or the common law.4

The Supreme Court decided the case on narrow grounds, finding that the MoneyGram instruments are “similar” to money orders and therefore subject to the federal statute, regardless of whether they are actually money orders. The Court adopted a practical approach and reasoned that the MoneyGram checks are similar to money orders in two key respects. First, they are similar in function and operation to money orders. And second, they have similar characteristics to the types of instruments Congress was attempting to address in the statute. Specifically, like money orders, MoneyGram had generally not collected the addresses of the creditors, and so if the common law priority rules were to apply, “then the abandoned proceeds would escheat inequitably solely to the State of incorporation, just like the money orders expressly referenced in the statute.”5

The Court’s decision was based, in part, on the practical consideration of avoiding the “inequitable” result of having all of the money go to the state of incorporation. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute—establishing a place-of-purchase standard for these payment instruments—was to prevent a “windfall” for one state over all others. Justice Jackson wrote for the Court that “the [Federal Disposition Act’s] text provides a solution for the problem of the inequitable distribution of escheats, and that solution expressly eschews requiring entities like Western Union to keep adequate records. Inadequate recordkeeping is thus highly relevant to the interpretive question of when the [Federal Disposition Act], rather than the common law, should apply to the escheatment of the intangible property at issue.”6

The Supreme Court found Delaware’s arguments to be unpersuasive because:


The remaining issue in the case involves the determination of the amounts owed by Delaware back to the other states, and the impact on state unclaimed property regimes, particularly in Delaware. For the liability determination, the case will go back to the Special Master to determine the amounts owed and any other remaining issues.

Key Takeaways:


  1. The Court seemed guided by the practical consideration of avoiding a “windfall” for one state over all others.
  2. By deciding the case on narrow grounds, the Court avoided wading into other potentially disputed unclaimed property issues, such as reconsideration of the common law priority rules. Other unclaimed property cases could find their way to the Supreme Court in future terms.
  3. The potential impact on Delaware and its unclaimed property program remain to be seen. The State could be required to distribute hundreds of millions of funds to other states based on the ruling in this case.


_______________


1 The Federal Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act, 12 U.S.C. § § 2501–03.

2 Delaware v. Pennsylvania, No. 145, 146, slip op. at 2, 9 (2023).

3 https://financefiles.delaware.gov/DEFAC/12-22/Revenue.pdf

4 A Special Master appointed by the Supreme Court initially agreed with Pennsylvania and the other states in his First Interim Report, finding that the federal statute and not the common law priority rules should apply to these disputed instruments. The Special Master later changed his recommendation after oral argument and issued a Second Interim Report, where he found that (1) some of the disputed instruments fell within the category of “other similar written instrument,” but would not be included in the category of “money order,” and (2) to the extent the disputed instruments are drawn by a bank as drawer, the disputed instruments would fall within the statute’s “third party bank checks” exception.

5 Delaware v. Pennsylvania, No. 145, 146, slip op. at 13–14 (2023).

7 Id. at 19 n.13.


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